



The unusual fertility increase experienced by many 
Arab countries in recent years is particularly visible in 
Egypt where fertility declined very slowly after 2000 to 
around 3 children per woman, then started increasing 
again in 2008 to reach 3.5 (2014 EDHS). This contra-
dicts the demographic transition theory and the earlier 
expectations of  some scholars [1]. Increased religiosity 
in the wake of  the Arab spring movements has often 
been mentioned as a possible reason for this upturn, 
but lack of  opportunities for young – most often high-
ly educated – women on the labour market is a more 
plausible explanation.
A fast increasing and large Egyptian popu-
lation
Egypt has a fast growing population. Moreover 
it is the largest and most densely populated Arab 
country, with 95 million inhabitants in 2017. Accor-
ding to the Egypt Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (EDHS) of  2008 and 2014, the total fertility rate 
(TFR) increased from 3.0 to 3.5 children per woman 
over the period, returning to the level recorded by 
the EDHS in 2000. In a country where demogra-
phic pressure is already very strong, this fertility in-
crease raises environmental and economic concerns,
and threatens the well-being of  Egypt’s inhabitants, 
especially in the context of  a faltering economy 
following the Arab Spring of  2011. 
Fertility is increasing among all social and 
geographical groups
The most striking feature of  the recent fertility in-
crease in Egypt is that it applies to practically all 
segments of  the female population, be it in urban 
or rural areas, in the generally poorer Upper go-
vernorates or the richer Lower governorates, or 
among the most or least educated (see Figure 1). 
Up to the 2000s, a process of  convergence was obser-
ved between fertility in urban and rural areas. While 
rural fertility fell from the very high level of  5.6 child-
ren per woman in 1988 to 3.2 children in 2008, the 
latest survey in 2014 revealed a trend reversal (TFR 
of  3.8 in 2014). Urban fertility has remained quite 
stable at around 3 children. The TFR stood at 2.5 in 
2014 in urban governorates strongly influenced by 
Cairo where more than 10% of  the Egyptian popula-
tion resides. During the period of  fertility decline, the 
decrease mainly concerned women residing in rural 
Upper Egypt where fertility fell from 6.3 children in 
1988, to 3.4 in 2008. Fertility in urban Upper Egypt 
remained stable, at around 3.5 children per woman. 
Between 2008 and 2014, the most rapid increase occur-
red in the rural areas of  Lower and Upper Egypt. In 
the former, fertility increased from 2.8 to 3.6 children. 
Why has fertility been increasing in Egypt?
A recent upturn in fertility has been observed in several Arab countries. This new trend is 
surprising and contradicts the demographic transition model. Is it linked to an increase in 
religiosity in these countries? Examining the case of Egypt, where the fertility rebound 
is very pronounced, Anne Goujon and Zakarya Al Zalak suggest that the high levels of 
unemployment among Egyptian women, the most educated in particular, may provide an 
alternative explanation. 
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What has happened since 2008? 
Women marry more frequently and at younger ages
In Egypt, as in other Arab countries, marriage is near-
ly universal and linked to fertility. While the share of  
never-married women aged 15-49 had been increasing 
until 20051, it declined very rapidly in the two sub-
sequent surveys (2008 and 2014). According to the most 
recent survey, it is now around 26%, lower than at any 
time in the last 25 years. As observed for fertility, most 
of  this change occurred among women in younger age 
groups – from ages 15 to 29, and particularly among 
those aged 20-24. It is important to note that teenage 
marriage is still very prevalent in Egypt: in 2014, more 
than half  a million girls aged 15-19 were ever-mar-
ried, corresponding to 85% of  the age group [3]. The 
median age at first marriage of  the higher educated 
has been moving downwards since 1988, falling from 
close to 25 years in that year to around 22 years in 2014. 
Women bear their children at younger ages
Until 2008, fertility within age groups decreased from 
one survey to the next, and most women had their child-
ren in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups, with far fewer 
births at older ages (Figure 2). The 2014 EDHS shows a 
different pattern: the fertility of  women in all age groups 
increased between 2008 and 2014, but strikingly for the 
age groups 20-24 (the ages of  peak 
fertility in 2014) and 25-29. This pat-
tern is unusual because in countries 
experiencing demographic transi-
tion, peak fertility tends to shift to 
older ages over time. Under current 
conditions, an average Egyptian wo-
man would already have 2.7 children 
by her 32nd birthday, representing 
more than three-quarters of  the total 
births she would have during her re-
productive life. 
Fewer women use long-term means 
of  contraception 
While married women’s contracep-
tive prevalence is quite high (practi-
cally constant at around 60% since 
2000) and they do not have less 
knowledge of  contraception or less 
overall access to family planning, the 
choice of  methods has changed. In 
2008, almost 60% of  contracepting 
women used an IUD (intra-uterine 
device) and 20% the contraceptive 
pill. The 2014 survey reveals a consi-
derable shift, with a drop in the pro-
portion of  women using the IUD (51% in 2014 ) and an 
increase in the share using the pill (27% in 2014). This 
trend is particularly acute among women below age 30, 
suggesting that more women are opting for a method 
which is easier to discontinue. This is happening in the 
context of  stability in the family norm of  Egyptian wo-
men, whose mean ideal number of  children has been 
around three children since 1988 and varies little by age, 
region, and place of  residence or level of  education.
Figure 2: Age-specific fertility rates (ASFR), 
Egypt, 1988–2014
Sources: EDHS 1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2014 
Note: TFR takes into account the births that occurred in the three years 
preceding each survey. 
 
Sources: EDHS 1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2014 
Note: TFR takes into account the births that occurred during the three years preceding the survey. Urban 
Governorates include the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez (with no rural populations). Nine 
governorates are located in the Nile Delta (Lower Egypt) and nine in the Nile Valley (Upper Egypt). The 
Lower and Upper Egypt governorates are further subdivided into urban and rural areas. Results are not 
shown for the five sparsely populated Frontier Governorates located on the eastern and western boundaries 
of Egypt.
Figure 1: Fertility trends by governorates (A) and by education (B), 
Egypt, 1988-2014
1  The divorce and widowhood rates remained at a constant low level   
   (CAPMAS 2015).
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Few women in work despite a high level of 
education
The explanation of  the Arab Spring-and the politi-
cal, economic and religious turmoil it provoked-does 
not really hold, as fertility had already stopped falling 
before the revolution, although it has certainly been a 
reinforcing factor in a country already affected by eco-
nomic crisis. It is often posited that women are having 
more children as a result of  increased religiosity in the 
population or that Egyptian society has become more 
conservative, with women being increasingly secluded 
in their homes. Although the Muslim brotherhood mo-
vement has been gaining ground in the population and 
even came to power in 2011-2012, values about the place 
of  religion in people’s life did not change during the 
10 years covered by the World Value Surveys between 
2001 and 2012. 
Moreover, young women’s levels of  education have 
increased steadily throughout Egypt’s various political 
and economic crises [4] (Figure 3)
Possibly the most convincing explanation for the stalling 
decline and recent upturn in fertility is the change in the 
overall economic and labour market situation in Egypt 
and its impact on women’s lives and fertility behaviour. 
Whereas the male labour market participation rate 
– i.e. the proportion of  working-age men who are 
either working or looking for work – is close to 
100%, that of  women is very low, at 30% in 2014 ac-
cording to estimates by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and has remained stable at 
this level since 2000 (Figure 4). In parallel, unemploy-
ment has been high for some time and has even in-
creased slightly in the last few years, reaching 25% for 
women and 9% for men in 2014. 
Figure 4: Trend in labour force participation and 
unemployment rates, Egypt, 1990–2014
Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 2016 (http://www.ilo.org)
Strikingly, unemployment rates are higher on average 
for the highly educated than for the less educated popu-
lation. The unemployment rate of  women with secon-
dary education or higher was above 24% in 2012, and 
above 32% in urban areas while that of  women with 
less than elementary education was below 8%. The cor-
responding figures for men indicate much lower levels, 
with unemployment rates of  5-7% for the higher educa-
ted, and around 2% for the lower educated. 
Why is women’s unemployment so high?
Until the late 1980s, the Egyptian economy was a vastly 
centralized planned economy. All educated Egyptians 
with a high-school level of  education (graduates of  
vocational secondary schools and technical institutes) 
or with university degrees were guaranteed a job in the 
state sector [3]. As a result, parents pushed their child-
ren to acquire high education levels as a way to secure 
a permanent position and better working conditions 
in the public sector. Under the Mubarak regime (1981-
2011), and the structural adjustment programme spon-
sored by the IMF and the World Bank in the early 1990s, 
the country adopted a package of  liberalization reforms 
which (among other things) seriously constrained public 
sector employment [5]. This is one of  the causes of  the 
low labour force participation and employment levels 
of  the more educated population, as families kept pu-
shing their children to acquire high levels of  education 
even though the public sector did not have the capacity 
to absorb all graduates [6]. While this accounts for the 
high unemployment rates among the most educated 
Source Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer, Version 1.2. Available here: 
www.Wittgensteincentre.org/dataexplorer
Note: The category low education includes women with no education or incom-
plete primary education; medium education includes women with a completed 
primary education or lower secondary education; and high education women 
with upper secondary and post-secondary education.
Figure 3: Level of education of Egyptian women 
aged 20-39 from 1970 to 2015
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for both men and women, it does not explain why edu-
cated women are less likely to be in the labour force 
and less likely to be employed. One of  the reasons is 
that women tend to choose fields of  study that make 
them less employable. Female students still opt for tra-
ditional educational specializations such as education, 
arts and humanities, or social sciences, rather than 
more specialized fields better suited to the needs of  the 
private sector [5]. 
The next reason is that most economic opportunities 
come from the informal sector dominated by low-qua-
lity jobs and a lack of  protections and benefits [6]. The 
informal sector has become the norm, especially after 
the economic crisis reinforced by the Arab Spring. The 
impact of  downturns in labour demand differs for men 
and for women. In the case of  women, they often result 
in overall reductions in participation rather than simply 
an increase in unemployment, and this is particularly the 
case for educated women [5].
While these phenomena increase the numbers of  
people in a precarious situation and should thus lead to 
lower fertility, as was shown in Europe after the 2008 
financial and economic crisis, the opposite has happened 
in Egypt. It is plausible that women who are faced with 
low opportunity costs and adverse conditions on the 
labour market may decide to enter marriage and bear 
their first child earlier than older cohorts of  women, but 
without having more children overall. If  so, this could 
lead to fewer births in the future once they have achieved 
their planned or ideal number of  children. 
***
The fertility increase observed in recent years in Egypt 
could mean that young (and mostly well-educated) wo-
men are taking advantage of  a period where they are 
available and mostly out of  work in order to have their 
children earlier in life. This could result in a decline in 
the near future, especially if  women enter the labour 
force and become actively employed. This could depend 
on several factors, such as a shift in the educational spe-
cialization of  women to make them more employable 
in the private sector,  and policies to lower the labour 
market barriers faced by women. 
As mentioned above, Egypt is not the only Arab country 
in this situation and some others – most notably Tunisia 
and Algeria – have been experiencing an unusual fertility 
increase since 2000. Economic stagnation and women’s 
lack of  access to the labour market are important factors 
behind these trends.
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After declining slowly to 3 children per woman on average in 
the mid-2000s, fertility in Egypt has risen back to 3.5 children 
in recent years. Women are marrying earlier and more frequent-
ly. They also bear their children at younger ages. Some argue 
that this reflects an increase in religiosity. The labour market 
difficulties of Egyptian women, the most educated especially, 
provide a more convincing explanation. Faced with a lack of job 
opportunities and a slack labour market, women may be deci-
ding to marry and have children earlier than previous cohorts, 
though without wishing to have larger families. If this is the case, 
the number of births should fall when these women have rea-
ched their desired family size. 
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